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ABSTRACT
The Pattern Recognition and Information Correlation System
(PATRIC) was an online support system using a criminal database
which promised to fulfill an urgent function for the community of
Southern California. Yet PATRIC was phased out at the Los
Angeles Police Department without ever having become fully oper-
ative. The experience raises questions about the ability of bureau-
cratic service organizations to implement and manage unconven-
tional technology and large scale projects. The evidence suggests
that human and organizational factors, on which a support system's
success or fai lure ultimately depends, were overlooked. The paper
relates the system failure to the organizational environment, and
suggests that consideration of the social factors be integrated into
the process of planning for information systems.
INTRODUCTION 1978; Hall, 1976; Keider, 1974; Leavitt,
1964, 1965; Munson and Hancock, 1977;
Studies over the last two decades have Zand, 1975; Zmud and Cox, 1979).
demonstrated clearly that the majority of
information systems fai I due to organiza- Implementation appears to be particularly
tional rather than strictly technological problematic for decision support systems
factors. Counter-implementation, rather (Keen and Scott Morton, 1978) in bureau-
than successful implementation, is a preva- cratic organizations (Bariff and Galbraith,
lent phenomenon (Bardach, 1977; Drake, 1978; Hall, 1976; Harvey, 1970; Keen, 1981;
1972; Grayson, 1973; Harvey, 1970; Keen, Keider, 1974; Laudon, 1974; Leavitt, 1964;
1981; Kling, 1974, 1978, 1980; Morgan and Munson and Hancock, 1977). Support
Soden, 1973; Schmitt and Kozar, 1978). systems differ from transactional, batch-
Although the organizationally related mode systems in several critical ways:
causes of system failure are numerous, a their usage is discretionary, they rely on
growing number of studies have focused external as well as internal data, require
on two interrelated variables found at the man/machine dialogue, and introduce new
root of unsuccessful implementations: the tasks into the organization (Ginzberg,
handicapping impact of politically moti- March, 1978; Harvey, 1970; Keen and Scott
vated, incompetent or pluralistic decision Morton, 1978; Leavitt, 1964, 1965; Mclean
making (Argyris, 1971; Bardach, 1977; Keen, and Riesling, 1977).
1981; Kling, 1980; Pettigrew, 1973; Schmitt
and Kozar, 1978; Yates, 1977), and the Bureaucratic organizations find task-alter-
problem of introducing change into ing, technologically induced change di ffi-
complex organizations (Ginzberg, March, cult because it tends to rearrange the
\
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power structure--or is perceived to do so part of the "rational" approach used by
by threatened or opportunistic employees most operations research and EDP staffs
(Argyris, 1970; Churchman, 1964; Hall, 1976; (Kling, 1980), they are easily overlooked.
Kling, 1974; Kraemer, 1977; Munson and While revealing these hidden variables is
Hancock, 1977). In turn, these employees not in itself a solution, it can be a first
take advantage of the organization's resis- step toward mitigating their disruptive
tance to change by using their power to power.
thwart the system (Bardach, 1977). Draw-
ing on Bardach's notion of an "implementa-
tion game," Keen (1981) suggests that many BACKGROUND AND SYSTEM
systems fail because of irrational, self- DEFINITION
interested decisions made by bureaucrats
who wish to protect their positions or dis- The Pattern Recognition and Information
credit someone else's. But even if no one Correlation System was born out of a real
is consciously playing at counterimplemen- need for an interactive, central databased
tation, success is not guaranteed because system capable of correlating a large
of what Keen (1981) diagnoses as an organi- volume of police-recorded data and detect-
zation's natural tendency toward a state of ing patterns of occurrence so that linked
"social inertia." Evidence of this inertia events could be presented to detectives in
can be found in the difficulty organizations composite form citywide. With such a
have integrating innovation · into their 'tool, for instance, one detective could go
social fabrics and static structures (Wolek, after one criminal and clear ten crimes
1975). In order for organizations to over- with the same effort. Without a PATRIC
come this state of inertia, an extraordinary system, it was not unusual to have ten
effort is required of individuals as well as a different detectives trying to solve ten
firm commitment to the project and to crimes that were all committed by the
change in general (Ginzberg, June, 1981; same criminal. The technique is based on
Wolek, 1975). Frequently, however, inertia the hypothesis that criminals tend to act in
is perpetuated by those who have the the same manner during their crimes, use
power and duty to reverse it: incompetent the same weapons, leave the same evi-
(Morgan and Soden, 1973) or inactive dence and so forth. But crimintils do not
(Schmitt and Kozar, 1978) management. always remain in the same area, even
' though the dectectives who must find them
This paper attempts to illustrate the are limited to ·specific territories--and
dynamics of these issues in the form of a information. With PATRIC, once the sus-
case study. The case revolves around a pect has been associated with the  crime
support system at the Los Angeles Police characteristics, or modi operandi, mention-.
Department (L.A.P.D.) which failed ed above, other crimes could be cleared
because of socio-political factors inherent with little addit onal field work or cross-
in the organizational environment and the area duplication.
inability of the L.A.P.D. to accommodate
and administer the innovative new systerA.
The case indicates that system developers I
do not yet have the vocabulary to deal with The Los Angeles Police Department
the hard-to-define "soft" variables (Keen, (L.A.P.D.) is divided into eighteen geo-
1981; Mintzberg, 1977) encountered once the graphical districts called Areas. There is
system is off the drawing boards in a real one Area office in each Area with central
organization. Since these variables cannot headquarters at the downtown Parker
be easi ly quanti f ied, are vague, and are not Center.
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Although a detective can manually corre- detective, the PATRIC analyst would carry
late historic crime data, the work is time- on a dialogue with the computer, increas-
consuming and too I imited in scope to be ing the queries as more information about
effective. The sophisticated cross-area, the crime became available, and widening
cross-crime correlation that PATRIC pro- or narrowing the parameters of the search
vided was beyond the cognitive ability of depending on the computer's responses.
any one detective or group of detectives. The detective required fast, online access
If a computerized system could perform and some help in the analysis of the output.
this function more effectively, the detec- For this reason, the idea of a support tool
live would be free to spend more time in operated by a full-time analyst emerged.
the field, and the L.A.P.D. would be mak- The system was envisioned to be similar to
ing more efficient use of its resources. "FAT BOY," the computer personified in
Travanian's bestselling spy novel, SHIBUMI
(Travanian, 1978):
THE DESIGN OF PATRIC
FAT BOY was a medley of informa-
Given this need, and PATRIC's promised tion from all the computers in the
capabilities, it was not difficult to gain western world...It contained the
acceptance for the project. The Federal most delicate information and the
Government backed the project with a most mundane. If you lived in the
seven million dollar loan. The incumbent western world, FAT BOY had
police chiefs were enthusiastic about the you...He had your blood type, your
state-of-the-art system which supported political history and birth certifi-
the implicit L.A.P.D. policy of automating cates...
police work for better control and lower
costs. A design study team was formed to Although PATRIC was to be more modest
translate this advanced concept into a in scope and would, ideally, contain only
workable system. criminal data, PATRIC would eventually
incorporate the Field Interview System,
From 1965 through 1974 a design team one of the automated systems already in
developed the "philosophy" of PATRIC and use at the L.A.P.D. The Field Interview
drew the blueprint for its design and imple- System was a compliment to PATRIC. It
mentation. The committee was comprised contained data about "suspicious" people
of members of the L.A.P.D.'s Automated stopped by patrol officers, but who did not
Information Division (AID), City Hall's necessarily have criminal records and were
 Data Services Bureau, and a local systems not associated with a specific crime--yet.
development company. The City Admini- PATRIC databases, on the other hand,
strative Officer (CEO) was responsible for would contain data on crimes that had
financial controls. The requirements of already been committed, but lacked a sos-
the system lead the design team to aban- pect. Once the two systems were merged
don the initial idea of a closed, fully auto- under the umbrella name PATRIC, the
mated system and turn instead to an inter- groundwork for an additional correlation
active, open, support system dependent feature would be in place.
upon a trained analyst or operator.
PATRIC would be the first system of this
kind at the L.A.P.D.
OVERLOOKED VARIABLES
This design was dictated by the nature of
the detective's work and problem-solving The design team worked closely with the
procedures. Working with input from the police in order to understand their needs
1 1
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and the nature of their work. Nonetheless, management. Political friction arose
several important variables were omitted because of divergent interests between the
from the design committee's consideration, two stakeholder groups within the division.
probably because they appeared beyond the In the early 1970's, AID was divided into
scope of their work, or were too close to two sections: Advanced Planning, which
be identified as potential problems. These was developing PATRIC, and Management
variables, which will be revealed in more Services, which was in charge of Data
detail in the remainder of this case, can be Entry and the already operative Field
grouped as follows: Interview System described above.
1. The political environment of the According to the grand design for the
L.A.P.D., especially as it is embedded L.A.P.D.'s automated network, PATRIC
in the structure of the organization, would eventually incorporate the free
and the crippling effect of decision standing Field Interview System. But by
making by committee; the time PATRIC was ready for imple-
mentation, certain lieutenants and ser-
2. The inability of the existing data pro- geants in the Management Services depart-
cessing structures and processes to ment had carved an empire they wished to
handle the data flow in such a way as to retain. PATRIC was seen as a threat to
guarantee its requisite quality; their domain, and the subtle battle for
control of the data, the analysts, the Field
3. The difficulty and total cost of integra- Interview System and the new system went
ting new components--personnel, tasks, on throughout the 1970's. As will be dis-
technology--into the bureaucracy and cussed later, the analyst was a victim of
making provisions for their long term these "implementation games" (Bardach,
support. 1977).
4. The importance of training and status
for the new personnel who would not The Data Flow Problem-"Garbage In,
only be new to the task, but would be Garbage Out"
the sole "marketers" of the new system.
With respect to the second variable, the
Because the designers were constructing a data flow, problems arose because the
"rational" system, and because there was, human element in the data flow process
at that time, no formal methodology in use was not given enough attention. Although
at Data Services Bureau for evaluating the the software contained many error controls
system's progress at various stages, these and data screening routines, the data path
factors were never seen as expl icit varia- before reaching the CRT's was subject to
bles to consider in the design and imple- human distortion. A brief summary of this
mentation. Yet left unchecked, these vari-
ables ultimately had the power to under-
mine  he long, expensive development 2
effort. Schmitt and Kozar ( 1978) describe a simi-
lar compounding of errors and omissions as
a "degenerative network of errors...that is
Power Plays in the Automated difficult to escape once it is entered."
Information Division Similarly, the full force of the overlooked
PATRIC variables comes from their cumu-
The enthusiasm top management felt for lative and also their combined effect on
PATRIC was not shared by all middle the system.
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path suggests there was rych room for the analyst would be looking for a blunt
"human error" in the system. instrument. A match would not be made,
even though the same criminal was in-
The path began at the scene of the crime volved.
when specially designed forms would be
filled out by police patrol officers. The L.A.P.D. was not able to ensure the
Although police supervisors, and later the coordination that would increase the data
analysts, stressed the importance of these consistency and quality. If facts fed intoforms, in emergency situations, they often the computer "FAT BOY" by "an army of
took lowest priority. The forms were mechanics and technicians" (Travanian,
batched at Area offices, then delivered 1979), data was entered into PATRIC by 53
dai ly to Data Entry where they were clerical workers who had no incentives to
logged in, and the forms coded. Narrative worry about data quality (Glasser, 1980).passages on the backs of the forms were Moreover, these workers never met with
scanned by coders for "code worthy" inci- patrol officers or analysts to discuss con-
dents or modi operandi unnoticed by the sistency in coding and the need for new
patrol officer. Keyers then entered the codes. Many of the clerks did not even
data into the database on CRT's. There know what PATRIC was. High turnover
were not enough keyers--and time--to arnong these clerks added to the analyst's
enter all the data, so data entry was also frustration, for even if the analyst were toselective. At some later date an analyst call Data Entry on the phone to question a
many miles away would use this data in her particular code, there was no guarantee
retrieval searches hoping data stored would the same person who entered the codes on
hatch her search and form a pattern. It a given day would be there on the day of
can be seen from this description that the the phone call. High turnover and vacan-match, and the success of PATRIC, cies in the Data Entry unit also resulted independed upon the investigative skills of work backlogs. Naturally, in a system
the patrol officer, the motivation and judg- designed to track criminals, the timelinessment of the officers and coders, and the of the data is crucial, and these backlogs
accuracy of the keyers. For example, a were thus detrimental to the system's per-
patrol officer might ignore a modi operand' formance . Error rate, which increased
that, months later, a detective searching with the turnover and vacancy rate, couldwith PATRIC might use as a key crime delay the data flow process. The analystcharacteristic. The same no-match would could be looking for a suspect that shouldresult if a coder could not find an appro- have been, but was not already, entered
priate code for that characteristic. Above into the system because the system re-
al 1, however, the system depended upon a jected the entry. The analyst's conclusionshigh degree of consistency across the might be that there was no such suspect
entire L.A.P.D. For example, if it were when in fact, there was.reported that a victim was hit over the
head with the end of a rifle, was the proper
code "a blunt instrument" or "a gun?" The The detective's attitude toward the system
coder might determine it was a gun, while and his confidence of the analyst depended
upon the quality of the data, and hence, on
the factors mentioned above. Since a
support system is evaluated on user atti-
3The mechanics of this process are des- tudes and voluntary usage (McLean &
cribed in great detail in my report, Riesling, 1977), the detective would only
"PATRIC at the L.A.P.D.--A Description" bother with PATRIC if it were perceived
(Glasser, 1980). as personally beneficial, on a practical
237
level.4 Yet the detectives sometimes this would be a problem. Yet the idea of a
called the printouts from PATRIC "gar- support system was a novel one at the
bage," and their complaints were justified L.A.P.D., and the introduction of a special-
to the extent that the data going in was ized civilian operator working in the Area
also "garbage." Offices was also new.
The L.A.P.D. assumed that the existing The design team envisioned a systern oper-
data flow structures and processes would ated by eighteen professionals working
suffice for PATRIC when the above exam- closely with the detective unit in each of
ples indicate the contrary. The idea of the Areas. Anyone familiar with Tra-
altering communication channels was not vanian's novel Shibumi would know that the
sufficiently addressed. The analysts' operator of "FAT BOY" was a fanatically
attempts to do so, discussed below, met devoted "artist" on whom the country's
with disfavor, precisely because they were greatest detective depended for informa-
attempting to alter the gtructural com- tion:
ponent ofthe bureaucracy. ,
Programming facts into FAT BOY
Integrating PATRIC into was the constant work of an army of
the Bureaucracy mechanics and technicians, but
getting useful information out of  
The Analyst him was a task for an artist, a
person with training, touch and
Although bureaucracies are, by nature, inspiration.
usually slow to accept change, there is no
evidence that the design team considered What the PATRIC needed was eighteen of
these "artists" to service the Southern
California community. After years of
4Frances Wolek ( 1975) supports this notion, development, negotiations by committee,
carrying it further. Pointing to the need to and management changes, what PATRIC
integrate systems into the "social fabric" received was five clerks in three Area
of the organization, he writes: "People offices. Two of the five terminals were
don't always do what is best for them. Just used for "special projects" at the AID
because a new technology is recognized as headquarters.
beneficial does not mean that it will be
adopted. The user must make a consider- The disparity between the plan and the
able effort...(and) for this effort to be reality of the project's resource allocation
made, there must be a solid commitment is apparently not unusual in complex envi-
on the part of the user." In the case of ronments when a system is being imple-
PATRIC, of course, there was no such mented over a long period of time. In a i
commitment at all. The struggle was to study Of ten MIS project failures, Morgan
persuade the detective to see the system and Soden (1973) found that most failures
as beneficial! were due to management's inability to plan
and control. There were several factors
55ee Michael J. Ginzberg's ( 1978) interest- influencing the outcome in PATRIC's case,
ing discussion of Harold Leavitt's ( 1964) including hiring practices, management
conceptualization of the organization as a changes, inadequate funding, and the in-
four-component diamond balancing its ability to raise new funds, and the lack of
structure, people, tasks, and technology on communication between the designers and
a precarious equilibrium. See also footnote those responsible for resource al location.
#9 to this paper. These are summarized below.
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Like many bureaucratic organizations, the often as it would if the system were com-
L.A.P.D. has strict pay grade scales and pletely distributed, for few detectives
hiring procedures. A specific job title would travel out of their way to use an
corresponds to a predetermined grade unfamiliar, discretionary tool. Even in
scale. Yet PATRIC required a new type of those Areas where there was a resident
employee. Although system designers are analyst, many detectives were reluctant to
concerned with the personnel implications use PATRIC because they felt threatened
of their systems, they are not responsible by a computer and "an inexperienced, civil-
for hiring or altering the rigid procedures ian female" hernming in on their territory.
in the Personnel Department. Therefore,
although the design called for eighteen Despite this unconducive arrangement, a
analysts, the designers could not create a few curious officers experimented with
new category of employee just for PATRIC. As they were transferred within
PATRIC. According to the protocol of the the L.A.P.D. to other Areas, they would be
bureaucracy, the analyst, as a civilian, the ones to call in for assistance. In time,
would either be hired in at the Junior the analysts became accepted not only as
Administrative Assistant level or at the aids, but socially as well. (The fact that
clerical level. The former level was more the analyst position was always filled by a
suitable to the needs of PATRIC because it woman may well be responsible in part
required o college degree. However, the both for this initial resistance, and the
idea of paying eighteen Junior Administra- later popularity of the analyst). Gradually,
tive Assistants to do what the city must word spread that the system was not a
have considered a keypunch job, could not replacement for the detective, but a
be pushed through Personnel or the City potentially valuable tool to serve him. By
Administrative Office which holds the this time, however, PATRIC's degenerative
purse strings of the L.A.P.D. The project course had caused officials to begin a
ended up with five principal clerks. gradual phase out.
Material resources had also been diverted
from PATRIC since its inception. Thirteen Costly Compromises in
of the eighteen CRT's were given over to Software Development
other uses. A new captain in charge at the
AID, along with other management Problems in managing a large software
changes, resulted in shifting priorities and project are by no means unique to the
less of a commitment to PATRIC. In L.A.P.D. (Hill, 1970). The point to be made
addition, Lyndon Johnson's "Law Enforce- here is that the consequences of a series of
ment Assistance" grant money that had predictable and unforeseeable difficulties
helped launch PATRIC, had dried up by the in connection with the software were not
mid 1970's. In the late 1970's, PATRIC was adequately dealt with. By [980, PATRIC's
one of the first projects to receive cut- phase out was generally acknowledged to
backs due to Proposition 13. be a result of the increasing difficulty and
high cost of its software maintenance. As
Acceptance of PATRIC was impaired by resources were diverted from PATRIC in
these allocation decisions. Because terms of personnel, software programming
PATRIC required a close working relation- also suffered a handicapping cutback.
ship between analyst and detective, the However, the problems with the software
system had to be easi ly available to the were not the cause of PATRIC's demise.
detective and perceived as beneficial on a They were, rather, symptoms of the
daily basis. Without an analyst in each organization's inability to manage the
Area, the system would not be used as system over time (Hi 1 1, 1970; Morgan and
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Soden, 1973). A brief background of the tion's inability to align management goals
software dilemma will serve to illustrate and decisions 10 be a basic cause of al [
this point. system failure. At the L.A.P.D. the prob-
lem was compounded by the varying
After completing most of the design work degrees of expertise tht each new middle
in 1974, the original vendor lost the con- manager brought to the job. PATRIC's
tract with the L.A.P.D. over an alleged Data Services Project Manager explains.
misuse of funds. IBM won the bid for the "A new person would come in and think he
final implementation and proposed using its knew what was going on. They were pro-
National Military Command Information fessioT' policemen, but amateurs in
Processing Systems (NIPS) which had been EDP."
used at the Pentagon. There were several
problems with this choice. First, NIPS was Because PATRIC was not formally evalu-
a sophisticated and complex system, per- ated with an eye toward correcting poten-
haps too advanced for the analysts who tial problems, it became locked in Schmitt
were finally hired, the degree of training and Kozar's (1978) "degenerative network
guaranteed, and the level of in-house pro- of errors," mentioned earlier. Bardach's
grammers. Second, this system would have (1977) recipe for successful counter-
to be superimposed on the groundwork laid implementation--rely on in
ertia, keep the
by the original vendor and substantial project hard to coordinate, complex and
adaptation was necessary. Third, IBM vaguely defined, and minimize the imple-
would be withdrawing vendor support after mentator's legitimacy and influence--was
1978. apparently easy to follow at the L.A.P.D.
Nonetheless, the decision was made to The decisions, or lack of decisions, regard-
proceed with NIPS. It was available to the ing the NIPS software adversely affected
L.A.P.D. for a token amount of money, and the system and its users. Apparently, NIPS
there were few alternatives. In addition, was constantly in need of repairs which
Data Services Bureau and AID felt confi- were beyond the abilities of the twelve
dent that by the time IBM withdrew sup- programmers assigned to the L.A.P.D.
port, its programmers could rewrite the Modification and updating of codes as new
entire system so that it could be main- crime patterns emerged was slow, or could
tained independently and would be better not be accommodated at all.
adapted to the L.A.P.D.'s needs.
Over the years, however, plans and prior- 6
ities changed. Data Services Bureau never Schmitt and Kozar (1978) are describing
worked on rewriting NIPS to guarantee its inter-organizational misalignments rather
longevity. In the words of one data proc- than the misalignments resulting from con-
essing employee, "we get our orders from secutive decisions made at di fferent
the L.A.P.D. If they want us to work on periods in time. Evidence here suggests
PATRIC, we do. If they give us other that both problems were experienced at
projects, we do those." the L.A.P.D.
Shifting priorities led to confusion and 7Also see Schmitt and Kozar ( 1978) for a
waste as plans which one decision maker brief discussion of the relationship between
approved were later reversed by another, poor decision makers and system fai lure,
consciously, or unconsciously. This pheno- and Morgan and Soden (1973) for further
menon is not unique to the L.A.P.D. discussion of the role of poor management
Schmitt and Kozor (1978) cite an organiza- in system failure.
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The mal functions and lack of adequate direct training from IBM and the super-
codes were reponsible for much of the visor. However, since many of the new and
frustration detectives and analysts felt in inexperienced analysts became frustrated
dealing with PATRIC. New codes were with their job, turnover was high. With
needed to differentiate one criminal from each new "generation" of analysts a little
another once a search was narrowed down bit of the original training was lost in the
to a subtle difference. If modi operandi "hand-me-down," semi-structured learning
could not be expanded to describe new process. Before long, in the words of one
kinds of crimes and criminals, the system analyst, "those who didn't know were
lost much of its value. teaching."
The general effect of malfunctions and
inadequacies in the software was that the The issue of training took on a political
systein would not be used. One data proc- tone because of the varying degrees of
essing employee comments: "If a detective competence among analysts. In numerous
tries the system once and it doesn't work, instances, one analyst was discouraged
or if an analyst always gets a busy signal, from helping a new analyst--even if her
then next time around they'll be less in- help had been solicited. Personal feelings
clined to even try." Even a considerable were also involved. In some cases new
effort on the part of the user (Welek, 1975) analysts were offended by a senior ana-
will not guarantee usage if the system is lyst's efforts to correct their way of oper-
not supported by the organization's visible ating PATRIC and would complain to their
commitment to the project (Ginzberg, supervisors. Since the supervisors seldom
June, 1981). understood the issues at hand, they would
not investigate the issues underlying the
allegations.Analyst Training and Status in
the Organization
Training The credibility of the system and its repu-
tation depended upon the quality of the
In adopting the NIPS software, the ana- analysts' work. Poorly trained analysts
lysts' training became a critical issue. Yet would resort to less effective systems,
Data Services Bureau personnel could such as the Field Interview System, rather
never even decide how much of the system than admit their inability to manipulate
to explain to the analysts. Too little PATRIC. This practice was counterpro-
knowledge was a dangerous thing with ductive because in many instances the
NIPS, but too much depth might confuse Field Interview System could not provide
and frustrate the analyst. The result was the same information that PATRIC could.
that the degree of expertise varied greatly An incorrect search further damaged
among the individual analysts, depending PATRIC's credibility and contributed to its
on their interest, competence, attitude, reputation as a very costly system as well.
and on who trained them.
Although training was considered impor- An analyst who was not well trained could
tant, an ongoing program was never insti- easi ly spend thousands of dollars of CPU
tutionalized. The problem began when the time per search by requiring the CPU to
training supervisor quit, reportedly because read through all the files rather than
of frustrations with the new system and systematically narrowing or widening the
personal allegiances to the old vendor. The scope of the search depending on the modi
first group of analysts had the benefit of operandi in question. The system lost
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favor in the eyes of the City Administr#- Despite their usefulness, the analysts were
tive Office by its poor cost/benefit ratio. not encouraged to pursue this public rela-
tions aspect of their job. According to one
Analyst Status and Job Satisfaction analyst, if she left her terminal in order to
perform the above mentioned responsibi 1-
If the analysts had to contend with inade- ities, she would often be reprimanded by
quote training, their status within the her supervisor. Many times the supervisor
L.A.P.D. had an even greater effect on would call to "check up" on the analysts'
morale and job satisfaction. PATRIC's activities.
failure or success was directly related to
the analyst's satisfaction with her job since
dissatisfaction could lead to a reduced One reason the analysts' responsibilities
level of system usage, which would tilt the could be altered at the whim of a super-
cost/benefit ratio against the system. The visor, was that they had never been ade-
analysts apparently suffered from the lack quately or concretely specified. In fact,
of support from their supervisors and the  Inalysts' Place within the organization
cdunterimplementation games. Says one was Jeopardized by the fact that the city's
analyst: "We were always being bad_ rigid hiring/pay scale framework did not
mouthed, and so was PATRIC." Another provide an accurate job description for the
adds, "No one ever listened to us or gave us new analyst. Conventional categories did
credit for knowing what we were doing." not correspond to the type of work theanalyst was originally supposed to do. This
Besides operating the terminal, the original same problem also made it difficult to
group of analysts was supposed to visit the properly evaluate an analyst's work, a
various Area offices to "market" the serious problem in any system (Keen, 1975).
system to detectives and also explain to
patrol officers how to fill out their crime When the time came to write new job
reports for easy and effective transfer into descriptions so that the analysts' status
the databases. This last task was crucial could be upgraded, there was no one at the
because, as has been mentioned, if there L.A.P.D. to write a proper justification,
was no consistency between what patrol one that sounded credible to the City
officers saw and noted and what the Administrative Office. The police relied
analyst was to retrieve months later, then on standard job classifications, which
the correlation could not be of use to the suggested the analyst was a typist, and
detective. were written in police jargon, which meant
little to the City Administrative Office.
The job upgrading was a particularly sore
point with one analyst who claims she was
Bln fact, there was never a real cost/ promised a career in computers, growth
benefit study for PATRIC. One Captain of potential, and more responsibility if sheAID assigned that task by the City Admin- transferred to PATRIC, but "none of those
istrative Office had to admit that such a promises were kept."
study was impossible. There were never
criteria developed for PATRIC's evalu-
ation, and too many confounding variables Lack of job descriptions and evaluation
would come into play (Glasser, 1980). Lack criteria thus helped make PATRIC an easy
of evaluation criteria put both analyst and prey to those intent on playing the "imple-
PATRIC in a precarious position. (See also mentation game." The system's legitimacy
Keen, 1975 for a discussion of problems in could never be established on an objective
system evaluation.) basis.
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I f the above I ist sounds I ike a conspiracy, related variable: the personnel who are
one analyst could not agree more. Far pawns in the game of success or fai lure.
from supporting the analysts in their tasks,
one lieutenant at AID reportedly wrote a Lawrence Williams from Cornell University
letter to the Deputy Chief of Police in- (1981) describes how difficult and politically
forming him that the system was not work- sensitive is the task of dealing with person-
ing and that it was a waste of time and nel issues--new job descriptions, new pay
money. This was written very early in scales, evaluation criteria, and so forth--
PATRIC's life cycle, before that accusa- when a new task or system is introduced in
tion was a foregone conclusion. an organization. These new jobs are hard
to peg because they do not fit into the
Today there are no analysts at the conventional levels used by the organi-
L.A.P.D. The detectives themselves use zation.
CRT's to perform a more basic kind o;
search. The status quo has been restored. There are no prescriptions for dealing ef-
But the inertia, undermining, and misman- fectively with the so-called "soft" varia-
agement that worked together to reject bles of information systems implementa-
the change, have not left the L.A.P.D. tion, but to ignore them is to increase the
unchanged. If the analysts have been dis- likelihood of system failure. A narrow
appointed, the city, too might ·have suf- perspective will overlook the fact that
fered a loss. In the words of one EDP "technology" is not socially neutral; it, like
employee: "We've regressed. The current other 'actors' in a situation, plays a role in
system cannot accomplish what PATRIC the social system" (Wolek, 1975).
did and could have done."
In arguing the case that more attention
must be paid to the way in which the
CONCLUDING REMARKS introduction of technology alters the for-
mal and informal social and professional
The interrelationships between the handi- fabric of the organization, it is interesting
capping effects of pluralistic decision mak- to turn to a piece of research done by Evan
ing, organizational politics, mismanage- and Black (1967). They conclude that "staff
ment, and the failure of innovation in com- specialists are more likely to entertain
plex organizations has just begun to be technical than administrative proposals.
explored in the literature of information This in turn, may be related to the reluc-
systems (Keen, 1981). The case of PATRIC tance of business organizations to engage
introduces more clear ly than some case in administrative innovations."
studies the involvement of another closely
In the future, perhaps more attention
should be paid to those so-called "admini-
'Basing his thesis on Leavitt's ( 1964) con- strative innovations" which must be intro-
ceptualization of the organization, Ginz- duced into an organization to restore i tsnatural equilibrium (Leavitt, 1964; Ginz-berg ( 1979) attirbutes system failure to the berg, 19781. Up until now, it has been theorganization's natural tendency to react to informal rnechanisrns of the organizationtask-altering innovation by either changing or the implementation game with its nega-the remaining components--people, task,
and structure--or undermining the innova- tive goals and side effects that emerge to
tion in order to restore the equilibrium. restore the equi librium when new com-
Since it is apparently easier to reject than ponents are introduced. What is needed is
to accommodate change many technolog- a positive, rational, and constructivemethod of achieving this balance.ical innovations fail.
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It is no longer enough to understand the Churchman, C.W. "Managerial Acceptance
technology. What is needed is a better of Scientific Recommendations," Cal-
understanding and analysis of the social ifornia Managemement Review, Fall,
milieu in which the system must be incor- 1964.
porated to survive. This discussion of the Drake, J.W. "The Administration of Trans-
social aspects of system failure and the portation Modelling Projects," Heath,
power of the "soft" variables, demonstrates Lexington, Massachusetts, 1972. pp.
the need for a wider frame of reference to 14-17.
be taken by systems developers and the Evan, W. M. and Black, G. "Implementa-
inclusion of behavioral, psychological, tion in Business Organizations: Some
economic, and political perspectives in Factors Associated with Success and
system design. Failure," Journal of *Business, Volume
40,1967, pp. 519-530.
What is the "power" of these "soft" vari- Ginzberg, M. J. "Redesign of Managerial
ables? In the case of PATRIC, hundreds of Tasks: A Requisite for Successful
thousands of dollars were spent on the Decision Support Systems," MIS
system in an attempt to make it work. At Quarterly, Volume 2, Number 1, March
the same time, the cumulative force of 1978, pp. 39-52.
social and organizational discontent and Ginzberg, M. J. "Key Recurrent Issues in
incompetence was invisibly working against the M[S Implementation Process," MIS
it. More important than the money, of Quarterly, Volume 5, Number 2, June
course, is the fact that a potentially valu- 1981, pp. 47-59.
able crime prevention and control tool was Glasser, J.E. "PATRIC at the L.A.P.D. --
lost to the community. If an organization A Description," Unpublished Paper,
cannot ensure the success of a system, Graduate School of Management,
given its social fabric, existing structures, U.C.L.A., Spring, Los Angeles, Cali-
financial constraints, and management fornia, 1980.
capabilities, implementation is often Grayson, D. J. "Management Science and
equivalent to killing the system. In the Business Practice," Harvard Business
case of innovative new systems, it may Review, Volume 51, July-August, 1973,
even be better to forego the project alto- pp. 41-48.
gether than try to launch it in an atmos- Hall, W.K. "Rationality, Irrationality, and
phere of compromise. the Policy Formulation Process in
Large Organizations, Planning Review,
Volume 4, Number 6, May 1976, pp. 22-
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